Spatial prisoner's dilemma optimally played in small-world networks
arXiv:2411.13741 · doi:10.1016/S0375-9601(03)00693-5
Abstract
Cooperation is commonly found in ecological and social systems even when it apparently seems that individuals can benefit from selfish behavior. We investigate how cooperation emerges with the spatial prisoner's dilemma played in a class of networks ranging from regular lattices to random networks. We find that, among these networks, small-world topology is the optimal structure when we take into account the speed at which cooperative behavior propagates. Our results may explain why the small-world properties are self-organized in real networks.
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