The unfairness of the revenue distribution system used in the UEFA club competitions
arXiv:2206.11746 · doi:10.1080/19406940.2022.2161600
Abstract
The Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) distributes commercial revenue from its club competitions according to a complex mechanism. Coefficient-based amounts are paid such that the participating teams are ranked on the basis of performances over the last 10 years. Due to the non-anonymity of this allocation rule, all clubs are interested in qualification together with lower-ranked teams, which makes the procedure incentive incompatible. In particular, the English club Arsenal is found to lose 132 thousand Euros prize money in the 2022/23 UEFA Europa League because of exerting full effort in its domestic championship. Two strategy-proof alternatives are proposed to divide fairly this pillar of the revenue distribution system.
arXiv comment8 pages, 1 table
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