paper

When neither team wants to win: a flaw of recent UEFA qualification rules

arXiv:1806.08578 · doi:10.1177/1747954120921001

Abstract

Tanking, the act of deliberately dropping points or losing a game in order to gain some other advantage, is usually seen as being against the spirit of sports. It can be even more serious if playing a draw is a (weakly) dominant strategy for both teams in a match, since this may lead to collusion. We show that such a situation occurred in a particular football match. As our generalisation reveals, the root of the problem resides in the incentive incompatibility of certain UEFA qualification rules. The governing bodies of major sports should choose strategy-proof tournament designs because of several reasons. First, they may lead to the elimination of a third, innocent team. Second, incentive incompatible rules may discourage both teams from scoring goals, and the players could be interested in improving other match statistics than the number of goals.

arXiv commentThis article draws from arXiv:1711.09973 in model setting. 10 pages, 1 table

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