Operationally-Safe Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading in Distribution Grids: A Game-Theoretic Market-Clearing Mechanism
arXiv:2107.13444 · doi:10.1109/TSG.2022.3158442
Abstract
In future distribution grids, prosumers (i.e., energy consumers with storage and/or production capabilities) will trade energy with each other and with the main grid. To ensure an efficient and safe operation of energy trading, in this paper, we formulate a peer-to-peer energy market of prosumers as a generalized aggregative game, in which a network operator is only responsible for the operational constraints of the system. We design a distributed market-clearing mechanism with convergence guarantee to an economically-efficient and operationally-safe configuration (i.e., a variational generalized Nash equilibrium). Numerical studies on the IEEE 37-bus testcase show the scalability of the proposed approach and suggest that active participation in the market is beneficial for both prosumers and the network operator.
arXiv comment11 pages, 8 figures. Published in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2022
References in corpus (8)
- OSQP: An Operator Splitting Solver for Quadratic Programs
- Transforming Energy Networks via Peer to Peer Energy Trading: Potential of Game Theoretic Approaches
- Distributed generalized Nash equilibrium seeking in aggregative games on time-varying networks
- Nash and Wardrop equilibria in aggregative games with coupling constraints
- Single-timescale distributed GNE seeking for aggregative games over networks via forward-backward operator splitting
- Fast generalized Nash equilibrium seeking under partial-decision information
- Semi-decentralized generalized Nash equilibrium seeking in monotone aggregative games
- Loss Allocation in Joint Transmission and Distribution Peer-to-Peer Markets