Single-timescale distributed GNE seeking for aggregative games over networks via forward-backward operator splitting
arXiv:1908.00107 · doi:10.1109/TAC.2020.3015354
Abstract
We consider aggregative games with affine coupling constraints, where agents have partial information on the aggregate value and can only communicate with neighbouring agents. We propose a single-layer distributed algorithm that reaches a variational generalized Nash equilibrium, under constant step sizes. The algorithm works on a single timescale, i.e., does not require multiple communication rounds between agents before updating their action. The convergence proof leverages an invariance property of the aggregate estimates and relies on a forward-backward splitting for two preconditioned operators and their restricted (strong) monotonicity properties on the consensus subspace.
arXiv comment8 pages, 8 figures, submitted to TAC
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