Hacking single-photon avalanche detector in quantum key distribution via pulse illumination

Abstract

Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proved to be information-theoretically secure in theory. Unfortunately, the imperfect devices in practice compromise its security. Thus, to improve the security property of practical QKD systems, a commonly used method is to patch the loopholes in the existing QKD systems. However, in this work, we show an adversary's capability of exploiting the imperfection of the patch itself to bypass the patch. Specifically, we experimentally demonstrate that, in the detector under test, the patch of photocurrent monitor against the detector blinding attack can be defeated by the pulse illumination attack proposed in this paper. We also analyze the secret key rate under the pulse illumination attack, which theoretically confirmed that Eve can conduct the attack to learn the secret key. This work indicates the importance of inspecting the security loopholes in a detection unit to further understand their impacts on a QKD system. The method of pulse illumination attack can be a general testing item in the security evaluation standard of QKD.

arXiv comment11 pages, 11 figures, 1 table

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Cited by in corpus (10)

• An approach for security evaluation and certification of a complete quantum communication system
• Preparing a commercial quantum key distribution system for certification against implementation loopholes
• Characterisation of state-preparation uncertainty in quantum key distribution
• Strong pulse illumination hacks self-differencing avalanche photodiode detectors in a high-speed quantum key distribution system
• Effect of light injection on the security of practical quantum key distribution
• Randomized ancillary qubit overcomes detector-control and intercept-resend hacking of quantum key distribution
• Security boundaries of an optical power limiter for protecting quantum key distribution systems
• Nonclassical Attack on a Quantum KeyDistribution System
• Simulations of distributed-phase-reference quantum key distribution protocols
• Loss-tolerant quantum key distribution with detection efficiency mismatch