Corruption and botnet defense: a mean field game approach

Abstract

Recently developed toy models for the mean-field games of corruption and botnet defence in cyber-security with three or four states of agents are extended to a more general mean-field-game model with $2d$ states, $d\in \mathbb{N}$. In order to tackle new technical difficulties arising from a larger state-space we introduce new asymptotic regimes, namely small discount and small interaction asymptotics. Moreover, the link between stationary and time-dependent solutions is established rigorously leading to a performance of the turnpike theory in a mean-field-game setting.

References in corpus (3)

• Mean field game model of corruption
• Mean-field-game model for Botnet defense in Cyber-security
• The evolutionary game of pressure (or interference), resistance and collaboration

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