The evolutionary game of pressure (or interference), resistance and collaboration

Abstract

In this paper we extend the framework of evolutionary inspection game put forward recently by the author and coworkers to a large class of conflict interactions dealing with the pressure executed by the major player (or principal) on the large group of small players that can resist this pressure or collaborate with the major player. We prove rigorous results on the convergence of various Markov decision models of interacting small agents (including evolutionary growth), namely pairwise, in groups and by coalition formation, to a deterministic evolution on the distributions of the state spaces of small players paying main attention to situations with an infinite state-space of small players. We supply rather precise rates of convergence. The theoretical results of the paper are applied to the analysis of the processes of inspection, corruption, cyber-security, counter-terrorism, banks and firms merging, strategically enhanced preferential attachment and many other.

References in corpus (4)

• On the Frequency of Severe Terrorist Events
• Mean field game model of corruption
• Mean-field-game model for Botnet defense in Cyber-security
• Microscopic Study Reveals the Singular Origins of Growth

Cited by in corpus (8)

• Mean field game model of corruption
• Mean-field-game model for Botnet defense in Cyber-security
• Corruption and botnet defense: a mean field game approach
• Linear quadratic mean field games with a major player: The multi-scale approach
• Constant Factor Approximate Solutions for Expanding Search on General Networks
• Evolutionary game of coalition building under external pressure
• Linear-Quadratic Mean Field Games with a Major Player: Nash certainty equivalence versus master equations
• Evolutionary, Mean-Field and Pressure-Resistance Game Modelling of Networks Security