Mean field game model of corruption
arXiv:1507.03240 · doi:10.1007/s13235-015-0175-x
Abstract
A simple model of corruption that takes into account the effect of the interaction of a large number of agents by both rational decision making and myopic behavior is developed. Its stationary version turns out to be a rare example of an exactly solvable model of mean-field-game type. The results show clearly how the presence of interaction (including social norms) influences the spread of corruption.
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