Noise properties in the ideal Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise secure communication system

Abstract

In this paper we determine the noise properties needed for unconditional security for the ideal Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key distribution system using simple statistical analysis. It has already been shown using physical laws that resistors and Johnson-like noise sources provide unconditional security. However real implementations use artificial noise generators, therefore it is a question if other kind of noise sources and resistor values could be used as well. We answer this question and in the same time we provide a theoretical basis to analyze real systems as well.

References in corpus (4)

• Noise in the wire: the real impact of wire resistance for the Johnson (-like) noise based secure communicator
• A classical key distribution system based on Johnson (like) noise - How secure?
• Response to Scheuer-Yariv: "A Classical Key-Distribution System based on Johnson (like) noise -How Secure?"
• On the security of key distribution based on Johnson-Nyquist noise

Cited by in corpus (7)

• On the "cracking" scheme in the paper "A directional coupler attack against the Kish key distribution system" by Gunn, Allison and Abbott
• Elimination of a Second-Law-attack, and all cable-resistance-based attacks, in the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system
• What kind of noise guarantees security for the Kirchhoff-Loop-Johnson-Noise key exchange?
• Analysis of an attenuator artifact in an experimental attack by Gunn-Allison-Abbott against the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system
• Resource requirements and speed versus geometry of unconditionally secure physical key exchanges
• Random Number Generator Attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise Secure Key Exchange Protocol
• Facts, myths and fights about the KLJN classical physical key exchanger