Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations with zealots
arXiv:1308.2273 · doi:10.1007/s00285-014-0770-2
Abstract
We investigate evolutionary dynamics of two-strategy matrix games with zealots in finite populations. Zealots are assumed to take either strategy regardless of the fitness. When the strategy selected by the zealots is the same, the fixation of the strategy selected by the zealots is a trivial outcome. We study fixation time in this scenario. We show that the fixation time is divided into three main regimes, in one of which the fixation time is short, and in the other two the fixation time is exponentially long in terms of the population size. Different from the case without zealots, there is a threshold selection intensity below which the fixation is fast for an arbitrary payoff matrix. We illustrate our results with examples of various social dilemma games.
1 table, 4 figures
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- How Committed Individuals Shape Social Dynamics: A Survey on Coordination Games and Social Dilemma Games
- Impact of Committed Minorities: Unveiling Critical Mass of Cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game
- Breaking coexistence: Zealotry vs. nonlinear social impact
- Strategic commitments shape collective cybersecurity under AI inequality