Opinion control in complex networks

Abstract

In many instances of election, the electorate appears to be a composite of partisan and independent voters. Given that partisans are not likely to convert to a different party, a main goal for a party could be to mobilize independent voters toward the party with the help of strong leadership, mass media, partisans, and effects of peer-to-peer influence. Based on the exact solution of the classical voter model dynamics in the presence of perfectly partisan voters (i.e., zealots), we propose a computational method to maximize the share of the party in a social network of independent voters by pinning control strategy. The party, corresponding to the controller or zealots, optimizes the nodes to be controlled given the information about the connectivity of independent voters and the set of nodes that the opponent party controls. We show that controlling hubs is generally a good strategy, whereas the optimized strategy is even better. The superiority of the optimized strategy is particularly eminent when the independent voters are connected as directed rather than undirected networks.

7 figures, 1 table

References in corpus (19)

• Finding community structure in networks using the eigenvectors of matrices
• Statistical physics of social dynamics
• Pinning-controllability of complex networks
• Voter Models on Heterogeneous Networks
• Does a Single Zealot Affect an Infinite Group of Voters ?
• On the Role of Zealotry in the Voter Model
• The role of inflexible minorities in the breaking of democratic opinion dynamics
• Characterizing the dynamical importance of network nodes and links
• Heterogeneous Voter Models
• Evolutionary dynamics and fixation probabilities in directed networks
• Evolution of cooperation driven by zealots
• Voting and Catalytic Processes with Inhomogeneities
• Social Structure and Opinion Formation
• Enhancing the spectral gap of networks by node removal
• Stochastic dynamics of the prisoner's dilemma with cooperation facilitators
• Impact of hierarchical modular structure on ranking of individual nodes in directed networks
• Can Partisan Voting Lead to Truth?
• Dynamics-based centrality for general directed networks
• Dynamical Response of Networks under External Perturbations: Exact Results

Cited by in corpus (2)

• Nonlinear $q$-voter model with inflexible zealots
• A Heterogeneous Out-of-Equilibrium Nonlinear $q$-Voter Model with Zealotry