Group Formation through Indirect Reciprocity

Abstract

The emergence of structure in cooperative relation is studied in a game theoretical model. It is proved that specific types of reciprocity norm lead individuals to split into two groups. The condition for the evolutionary stability of the norms is also revealed. This result suggests a connection between group formation and a specific type of reciprocity norm in our society.

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Cited by in corpus (10)

• Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity
• Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment
• The Evolution of Reputation-Based Cooperation in Regular Networks
• Indirect reciprocity with stochastic rules
• Spreading of intolerance under economic stress: results from a model with reputation
• Balanced-imbalanced transitions in indirect reciprocity dynamics on networks
• Exact cluster dynamics of indirect reciprocity in complete graphs
• Inequality leads to the evolution of intolerance in reputation-based populations
• Model for clustering of living species
• Indirect reciprocity as a dynamics for weak balance