Effect of detector dead-times on the security evaluation of differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution against sequential attacks
arXiv:0803.1473 · doi:10.1103/PhysRevA.77.052321
Abstract
We investigate limitations imposed by detector dead-times on the performance of sequential attacks against a differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol with weak coherent pulses. In particular, we analyze sequential attacks based on unambiguous state discrimination of the signal states emitted by the source and we obtain ultimate upper bounds on the maximal distance achievable by a DPS QKD scheme both in the so-called trusted and untrusted device scenarios, respectively.
21 pages, 14 figures
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- Security of differential phase shift QKD from relativistic principles
- Security proof of differential phase shift quantum key distribution in the noiseless case
- Hacking coherent-one-way quantum key distribution with present-day technology
- Information Geometric Security Analysis of Differential Phase Shift Quantum Key Distribution Protocol