228 citations
Counting papers with at most 25 authors, so collaboration author lists do not stand in for the people here.
- Sapienza University of RomeIT12 papers
- Santa Fe InstituteUS7 papers
- University of PalermoIT5 papers
- University of PisaIT5 papers
- Adolfo Ibáñez UniversityCL4 papers
- Central European UniversityAT4 papers
- Scuola Normale SuperioreIT4 papers
- University of MacerataIT4 papers
- University of OxfordGB4 papers
- Centre National de la Recherche ScientifiqueFR3 papers
- ERABLE: Equipe de recherche européenne en algorithmique et biologie formelle et expérimentaleFR3 papers
- Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyUS3 papers
5 papers · 2 filters
Approximately Efficient Two-Sided Combinatorial Auctions
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Paul Goldberg, Bart de Keijzer +3
Mechanism design for one-sided markets has been investigated for several decades in economics and in computer science. More recently, there has been an increased attention on mecha…
Revenue Maximizing Envy-Free Pricing in Matching Markets with Budgets
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Stefano Leonardi, Qiang Zhang
We study envy-free pricing mechanisms in matching markets with items and budget constrained buyers. Each buyer is interested in a subset of the items on sale, and she appra…
Dynamic Atomic Congestion Games with Seasonal Flows
Marco Scarsini, Marc Schröder, Tristan Tomala
We propose a model of discrete time dynamic congestion games with atomic players and a single source-destination pair. The latencies of edges are composed by free-flow transit time…
On the Price of Anarchy of Highly Congested Nonatomic Network Games
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Roberto Cominetti, Marco Scarsini
We consider nonatomic network games with one source and one destination. We examine the asymptotic behavior of the price of anarchy as the inflow increases. In accordance with some…
Location Games on Networks: Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria
Gaëtan Fournier, Marco Scarsini
We consider a game where a finite number of retailers choose a location, given that their potential consumers are distributed on a network. Retailers do not compete on price but on…