2 citations · 4 across the 12 of their papers we have counts for
13 papers
Consistencies in Social Ranking
Takahiro Suzuki, Michele Aleandri, Stefano Moretti
Ranking individuals based on their performance in different coalitions is a problem emerging in various domains (teams sports, scientific evaluation, argumentation, etc.). Often, f…
Coopetitive Index: a measure of cooperation and competition in coalition formation
Michele Aleandri, Marco Dall'Aglio
We extend the coopetition index introduced by Aleandri and Dall'Aglio (2025) for simple games to the broader class of monotone transferable utility (TU) games and to all non-empty…
Power in Sharing Networks with a priori Unions
Michele Aleandri, Francesco Ciardiello, Andrea Di Liddo
We introduce and analyze a novel family of power indices tailored for sharing networks in technological markets, where firms operate competitively within, but not across, distinct…
Independence Axioms in Social Ranking
Takahiro Suzuki, Michele Aleandri, Stefano Moretti
Independence from non-essential changes in input information is a widely recognized axiom in social choice theory. This independence reduces the cost of specifying and/or analyzing…
Mill's canons meet social ranking: A characterization of plurality
Takahiro Suzuki, Michele Aleandri, Stefano Moretti
In his book entitled ''A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive'' (1843), John Stuart Mill proposed principles of inductive reasoning in the form of five canons. To date, the…
Ranking alternatives from opinions on criteria
Takahiro Suzuki, Stefano Moretti, Michele Aleandri
A primary challenge in collective decision-making is that achieving unanimous agreement is difficult, even at the level of criteria. The history of social choice theory illustrates…
A Coopetition Index for Coalitions in Simple Games
Michele Aleandri, Marco Dall'Aglio
In simple games, larger coalitions typically wield more power, but do all players align their efforts effectively? Consider a voting scenario where a coalition forms, but needs mor…
Desirability and social rankings
Michele Aleandri, Felix Fritz, Stefano Moretti
In coalitional games, a player is regarded as strictly more desirable than player if substituting with within any coalition leads to a strict augmentation in the va…
Lexicographic Ranking based on Minimal Winning Coalitions
Michele Aleandri, Vito Fragnelli, Stefano Moretti
In this paper, we consider the consistency of the desirability relation with the ranking of the players in a simple game provided by some well-known solutions, in particular the Pu…
With a little help from my friends: essentiality vs opportunity in group criticality
Michele Aleandri, Marco Dall'Aglio
We define a notion of the criticality of a player for simple monotone games based on cooperation with other players, either to form a winning coalition or to break a winning one, w…
Delay-induced periodic behavior in competitive populations
Michele Aleandri, Ida Germana Minelli
We study a model of binary decisions in a fully connected network of interacting agents. Individual decisions are determined by social influence, coming from direct interactions wi…
A combinatorial representation for the invariant measure of diffusion processes on metric graphs
Michele Aleandri, Matteo Colangeli, Davide Gabrielli
We give a generalization to a continuous setting of the classic Markov chain tree Theorem. In particular, we consider an irreducible diffusion process on a metric graph. The unique…
Opinion dynamics with Lotka-Volterra type interactions
Michele Aleandri, Ida G. Minelli
We investigate a class of models for opinion dynamics in a population with two interacting families of individuals. Each family has an intrinsic mean field "Voter-like" dynamics wh…