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6 papers · 2 filters
Reward and cooperation in the spatial public goods game
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaz Perc
The promise of punishment and reward in promoting public cooperation is debatable. While punishment is traditionally considered more successful than reward, the fact that the cost…
Dynamically generated cyclic dominance in spatial prisoner's dilemma games
Attila Szolnoki, Zhen Wang, Jinlong Wang +1
We have studied the impact of time-dependent learning capacities of players in the framework of spatial prisoner's dilemma game. In our model, this capacity of players may decrease…
Punish, but not too hard: How costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game
Dirk Helbing, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaz Perc +1
We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games where, besides the classical strategies of cooperation (C) and defection (D), we consider punishing cooperators…
Defector-accelerated cooperativeness and punishment in public goods games with mutations
Dirk Helbing, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaz Perc +1
We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with four competing strategies: cooperators, defectors, punishing cooperators, and punishing defectors. To explo…
Impact of critical mass on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaz Perc
We study the evolution of cooperation under the assumption that the collective benefits of group membership can only be harvested if the fraction of cooperators within the group, i…
Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions
Dirk Helbing, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaz Perc +1
Situations where individuals have to contribute to joint efforts or share scarce resources are ubiquitous. Yet, without proper mechanisms to ensure cooperation, the evolutionary pr…