7.5k citations
Counting papers with at most 25 authors, so collaboration author lists do not stand in for the people here.
- Hungarian Academy of SciencesHU80 papers
- HUN-REN Centre for Energy ResearchHU51 papers
- University of MariborSI42 papers
- HUN-REN Research Centre for Natural SciencesHU32 papers
- Institute for Solid State Physics and OpticsHU23 papers
- Eötvös Loránd UniversityHU22 papers
- Helmholtz-Zentrum Dresden-RossendorfDE15 papers
- Budapest University of Technology and EconomicsHU11 papers
- HUN-REN Wigner Research Centre for PhysicsHU11 papers
- Korea Research Institute of Standards and ScienceKR11 papers
- University of NamurBE10 papers
- University of Electronic Science and Technology of ChinaCN9 papers
63 papers · 1 filter
Supervised tax compliance and evasion from a spatial evolutionary game perspective
Qin Li, Ting Ling, Minyu Feng +1
Taxation constitutes a fundamental component of modern national economic systems, exerting profound impacts on both societal functioning and governmental operations. In this paper,…
Community detection in hypergraphs through hyperedge percolation
Bianka Kovács, Barnabás Benedek, Gergely Palla
Complex networks often exhibit community structure, with communities corresponding to denser subgraphs in which nodes are closely linked. When modelling systems where interactions…
Leaving bads provides better outcome than approaching goods in a social dilemma
Zhilong Xiao, Xiaojie Chen, Attila Szolnoki
Individual migration has been regarded as an important factor for the evolution of cooperation in mobile populations. Motivations of migration, however, can be largely divergent: o…
Seasonal payoff variations and the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaz Perc
Varying environmental conditions affect relations between interacting individuals in social dilemmas, thus affecting also the evolution of cooperation. Oftentimes these environment…
Exploring optimal institutional incentives for public cooperation
Shengxian Wang, Xiaojie Chen, Attila Szolnoki
Prosocial incentive can promote cooperation, but providing incentive is costly. Institutions in human society may prefer to use an incentive strategy which is able to promote coope…
Mobility restores the mechanism which supports cooperation in the voluntary prisoner's dilemma game
Marcos Cardinot, Colm O'Riordan, Josephine Griffith +1
It is generally believed that in a situation where individual and collective interests are in conflict, the availability of optional participation is a key mechanism to maintain co…
Central governance based on monitoring and reporting solves the collective-risk social dilemma
Nanrong He, Xiaojie Chen, Attila Szolnoki
Monitoring and reporting incorrect acts are pervasive for maintaining human cooperation, but in theory it is unclear how they influence each other. To explore their possible intera…
Competition and partnership between conformity and payoff-based imitations in social dilemmas
Attila Szolnoki, Xiaojie Chen
Learning from a partner who collects higher payoff is a frequently used working hypothesis in evolutionary game theory. One of the alternative dynamical rules is when the focal pla…
Reciprocity-based cooperative phalanx maintained by overconfident players
Attila Szolnoki, Xiaojie Chen
According to the evolutionary game theory principle, a strategy representing a higher payoff can spread among competitors. But there are cases when a player consistently overestima…
Dynamic-sensitive cooperation in the presence of multiple strategy updating rules
Attila Szolnoki, Zsuzsa Danku
The importance of microscopic details on cooperation level is an intensively studied aspect of evolutionary game theory. Interestingly, these details become crucial on heterogeneou…
Punishment and inspection for governing the commons in a feedback-evolving game
Xiaojie Chen, Attila Szolnoki
Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members. While cooperator players restrain themselves and consider the proper state of resources, defectors demand more…
Imitate or innovate: competition of strategy updating attitudes in spatial social dilemma games
Zsuzsa Danku, Zhen Wang, Attila Szolnoki
Evolution is based on the assumption that competing players update their strategies to increase their individual payoffs. However, while the applied updating method can be differen…
Environmental feedback drives cooperation in spatial social dilemmas
Attila Szolnoki, Xiaojie Chen
Exploiting others is beneficial individually but it could also be detrimental globally. The reverse is also true: a higher cooperation level may change the environment in a way tha…
Griffiths phases in infinite-dimensional, non-hierarchical modular networks
Wesley Cota, Géza Ódor, Silvio C. Ferreira
Griffiths phases (GPs), generated by the heterogeneities on modular networks, have recently been suggested to provide a mechanism, rid of fine parameter tuning, to explain the crit…
Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in neutral populations
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaz Perc
Cooperation is a difficult proposition in the face of Darwinian selection. Those that defect have an evolutionary advantage over cooperators who should therefore die out. However,…
Leaders should not be conformists in evolutionary social dilemmas
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaz Perc
The most common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that players should adopt a strategy that warrants the highest payoff. However, recent studies indicate that the spatial s…
Collective influence in evolutionary social dilemmas
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaz Perc
When evolutionary games are contested in structured populations, the degree of each player in the network plays an important role. If they exist, hubs often determine the fate of t…
The coevolution of overconfidence and bluffing in the resource competition game
Kun Li, Attila Szolnoki, Rui Cong +1
Resources are often limited, therefore it is essential how convincingly competitors present their claims for them. Beside a player's natural capacity, here overconfidence and bluff…
Griffiths effects of the susceptible-infected-susceptible epidemic model on random power-law networks
Wesley Cota, Silvio C. Ferreira, Géza Ódor
We provide numerical evidence for slow dynamics of the susceptible-infected-susceptible model evolving on finite-size random networks with power-law degree distributions. Extensive…
Vortices determine the dynamics of biodiversity in cyclical interactions with protection spillovers
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaz Perc
If rock beats scissors and scissors beat paper, one might assume that rock beats paper too. But this is not the case for intransitive relationships that make up the famous rock-pap…
Benefits of tolerance in public goods games
Attila Szolnoki, Xiaojie Chen
Leaving the joint enterprise when defection is unveiled is always a viable option to avoid being exploited. Although loner strategy helps the population not to be trapped into the…
Competition and cooperation among different punishing strategies in the spatial public goods game
Xiaojie Chen, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaz Perc
Inspired by the fact that people have diverse propensities to punish wrongdoers, we study a spatial public goods game with defectors and different types of punishing cooperators. D…
Evolutionary potential games on lattices
Gyorgy Szabo, Istvan Borsos
Game theory provides a general mathematical background to study the effect of pair interactions and evolutionary rules on the macroscopic behavior of multi-player games where playe…
Different perceptions of social dilemmas: Evolutionary multigames in structured populations
Zhen Wang, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaz Perc
Motivated by the fact that the same social dilemma can be perceived differently by different players, we here study evolutionary multigames in structured populations. While the cor…