24 citations · 71 across the 16 of their papers we have counts for
10 papers · 1 filter
Revenue Maximization Mechanisms for an Uninformed Mediator with Communication Abilities
Zhikang Fan, Weiran Shen
Consider a market where a seller owns an item for sale and a buyer wants to purchase it. Each player has private information, known as their type. It can be costly and difficult fo…
Multiplayer General Lotto game
Yan Liu, Bonan Ni, Weiran Shen +2
In this paper, we investigate the multiplayer General Lotto game across multiple battlefields, a significant variant of the Colonel Blotto game. In this version, each player employ…
Sequential Persuasion Using Limited Experiments
Bonan Ni, Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang
Bayesian persuasion and its derived information design problem has been one of the main research agendas in the economics and computation literature over the past decade. However,…
Inverse Game Theory for Stackelberg Games: the Blessing of Bounded Rationality
Jibang Wu, Weiran Shen, Fei Fang +1
Optimizing strategic decisions (a.k.a. computing equilibrium) is key to the success of many non-cooperative multi-agent applications. However, in many real-world situations, we may…
Optimal Pricing of Information
Shuze Liu, Weiran Shen, Haifeng Xu
A decision maker is choosing between an active action (e.g., purchase a house, invest certain stock) and a passive action. The payoff of the active action depends on the buyer's pr…
Green Security Game with Community Engagement
Taoan Huang, Weiran Shen, David Zeng +3
While game-theoretic models and algorithms have been developed to combat illegal activities, such as poaching and over-fishing, in green security domains, none of the existing work…
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in First-Price Auction with Discrete Value Distributions
Weiran Shen, Zihe Wang, Song Zuo
First price auctions are widely used in government contracts and industrial auctions. In this paper, we consider the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) in first price auctions with di…
Reinforcement Mechanism Design, with Applications to Dynamic Pricing in Sponsored Search Auctions
Weiran Shen, Binghui Peng, Hanpeng Liu +7
In this study, we apply reinforcement learning techniques and propose what we call reinforcement mechanism design to tackle the dynamic pricing problem in sponsored search auctions…
Hotelling-Downs Model with Limited Attraction
Weiran Shen, Zihe Wang
In this paper we study variations of the standard Hotelling-Downs model of spatial competition, where each agent attracts the clients in a restricted neighborhood, each client rand…
Coalitional Permutation Manipulations in the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
Weiran Shen, Yuan Deng, Pingzhong Tang
In this paper, we consider permutation manipulations by any subset of women in the men-proposing version of the Gale-Shapley algorithm. This paper is motivated by the college admis…