3 papers
cs.GT2024
Optimal Fixed-Price Mechanism with Signaling
Zhikang Fan, Weiran Shen
Consider a trade market with one seller and multiple buyers. The seller aims to sell an indivisible item and maximize their revenue. This paper focuses on a simple and popular mech…
cs.GT2024
Selling an Item through Persuasion
Zhikang Fan, Weiran Shen
A monopolistic seller aims to sell an indivisible item to multiple potential buyers. Each buyer's valuation depends on their private type and the item's quality. The seller can obs…
cs.GT2024
Optimal Mediation Mechanism in Bilateral Trade
Zhikang Fan, Weiran Shen, Shaojie Tang +1
We study the problem of designing revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a selfish mediator who facilitates trade between a buyer and a seller. We consider a setting where the mediator…