activity
20172022
most citedReinforcement Mechanism Design, with Applications to Dynamic Pricing in Sponsored Search Auctions

24 citations · 33 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

7 papers

cs.GT20226 cited

Inverse Game Theory for Stackelberg Games: the Blessing of Bounded Rationality

Jibang Wu, Weiran Shen, Fei Fang +1

Optimizing strategic decisions (a.k.a. computing equilibrium) is key to the success of many non-cooperative multi-agent applications. However, in many real-world situations, we may…

cs.GT2021

Optimal Pricing of Information

Shuze Liu, Weiran Shen, Haifeng Xu

A decision maker is choosing between an active action (e.g., purchase a house, invest certain stock) and a passive action. The payoff of the active action depends on the buyer's pr…

cs.GT20202 cited

Green Security Game with Community Engagement

Taoan Huang, Weiran Shen, David Zeng +3

While game-theoretic models and algorithms have been developed to combat illegal activities, such as poaching and over-fishing, in green security domains, none of the existing work…

cs.MA2020

Mechanism Design for Multi-Party Machine Learning

Mengjing Chen, Yang Liu, Weiran Shen +3

In a multi-party machine learning system, different parties cooperate on optimizing towards better models by sharing data in a privacy-preserving way. A major challenge in learning…

cs.GT2019

Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in First-Price Auction with Discrete Value Distributions

Weiran Shen, Zihe Wang, Song Zuo

First price auctions are widely used in government contracts and industrial auctions. In this paper, we consider the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) in first price auctions with di…

cs.LG20191 cited

Learning to Clear the Market

Weiran Shen, Sébastien Lahaie, Renato Paes Leme

The problem of market clearing is to set a price for an item such that quantity demanded equals quantity supplied. In this work, we cast the problem of predicting clearing prices i…