34 citations · 429 across the 66 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 1 filter
Fair Multi-Cake Cutting
Erel Segal-Halevi
In the classic problem of fair cake-cutting, a single interval ("cake") has to be divided among n agents with different value measures, giving each agent a single sub-interval with…
Fairness for Multi-Self Agents
Sophie Bade, Erel Segal-Halevi
We investigate whether fairness is compatible with efficiency in economies with multi-self agents, who may not be able to integrate their multiple objectives into a single complete…
Fair Cake-Cutting in Practice
Maria Kyropoulou, Josué Ortega, Erel Segal-Halevi
Using a lab experiment, we investigate the real-life performance of envy-free and proportional cake-cutting procedures with respect to fairness and preference manipulation. We find…
Obtaining Costly Unverifiable Valuations from a Single Agent
Shani Alkobi, David Sarne, Erel Segal-Halevi +1
We consider the problem of a principal who needs to elicit the true worth of an object she owns from an agent who has a unique ability to compute this information. The correctness…
Cake-Cutting with Different Entitlements: How Many Cuts are Needed?
Erel Segal-Halevi
A cake has to be divided fairly among agents. When all agents have equal entitlements, it is known that such a division can be implemented with cuts. When agents may have…