Cake-Cutting with Different Entitlements: How Many Cuts are Needed?
arXiv:1803.05470 · doi:10.1016/j.jmaa.2019.123382
Abstract
A cake has to be divided fairly among agents. When all agents have equal entitlements, it is known that such a division can be implemented with cuts. When agents may have different entitlements, the paper shows that at least cuts may be necessary, and cuts are always sufficient.
Shorten the proof of the upper bound
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