Fair Cake-Cutting among Families
arXiv:1510.03903 · doi:10.1007/s00355-019-01210-9
Abstract
We study the fair division of a continuous resource, such as a land-estate or a time-interval, among pre-specified groups of agents, such as families. Each family is given a piece of the resource and this piece is used simultaneously by all family members, while different members may have different value functions. Three ways to assess the fairness of such a division are examined. (a) Average Fairness means that each family's share is fair according to the "family value function", defined as the arithmetic mean of the value functions of the family members. (b) Unanimous Fairness means that all members in all families feel that their family's share is fair according to their personal value function. (c) Democratic Fairness means that in each family, at least a fixed fraction (e.g. a half) of the members feel that their family's share is fair. We compare these criteria based on the number of connected components in the resulting division and on their compatibility with Pareto-efficiency.
Add a cool reduction from equitable division among individuals to average-proportional division among families
References in corpus (6)
- Asymptotic Existence of Fair Divisions for Groups
- Fair and Square: Cake-Cutting in Two Dimensions
- Monotonicity and Competitive Equilibrium in Cake-cutting
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- Social Integration in Two-Sided Matching Markets
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Cited by in corpus (7)
- Democratic Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods
- Mind the Gap: Cake Cutting With Separation
- How to Cut a Cake Fairly: A Generalization to Groups
- Almost Envy-Freeness for Groups: Improved Bounds via Discrepancy Theory
- Cutting a Cake Fairly for Groups Revisited
- Your College Dorm and Dormmates: Fair Resource Sharing with Externalities
- Ordinal Maximin Guarantees for Group Fair Division