32 citations · 103 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers
Robust Voting under Uncertainty
Satoshi Nakada, Shmuel Nitzan, Takashi Ui
This paper proposes normative criteria for voting rules under uncertainty about individual preferences. The criteria emphasize the importance of responsiveness, i.e., the probabili…
Flexible Level-1 Consensus Ensuring Stable Social Choice: Analysis and Algorithms
Mor Nitzan, Shmuel Nitzan, Erel Segal-Halevi
Level-1 Consensus is a property of a preference-profile. Intuitively, it means that there exists a preference relation which induces an ordering of all other preferences such that…
Envy-Free Division of Land
Erel Segal-Halevi, Shmuel Nitzan, Avinatan Hassidim +1
Classic cake-cutting algorithms enable people with different preferences to divide among them a heterogeneous resource (``cake''), such that the resulting division is fair accordin…
Envy-Free Cake-Cutting among Families
Erel Segal-Halevi, Shmuel Nitzan
This paper extends the classic cake-cutting problem to a situation in which the "cake" is divided among families. Each piece of cake is owned and used simultaneously by all members…
Fair Cake-Cutting among Families
Erel Segal-Halevi, Shmuel Nitzan
We study the fair division of a continuous resource, such as a land-estate or a time-interval, among pre-specified groups of agents, such as families. Each family is given a piece…
Fair and Square: Cake-Cutting in Two Dimensions
Erel Segal-Halevi, Shmuel Nitzan, Avinatan Hassidim +1
We consider the classic problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous good ("cake") among several agents with different valuations. Classic cake-cutting procedures either allocate eac…
Fair and Square: Cake-cutting in Two Dimensions
Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
We consider the problem of fairly dividing a two dimensional heterogeneous good among multiple players. Applications include division of land as well as ad space in print and elect…