4 papers
Robust Voting under Uncertainty
Satoshi Nakada, Shmuel Nitzan, Takashi Ui
This paper proposes normative criteria for voting rules under uncertainty about individual preferences. The criteria emphasize the importance of responsiveness, i.e., the probabili…
Flexible Level-1 Consensus Ensuring Stable Social Choice: Analysis and Algorithms
Mor Nitzan, Shmuel Nitzan, Erel Segal-Halevi
Level-1 Consensus is a property of a preference-profile. Intuitively, it means that there exists a preference relation which induces an ordering of all other preferences such that…
Envy-Free Division of Land
Erel Segal-Halevi, Shmuel Nitzan, Avinatan Hassidim +1
Classic cake-cutting algorithms enable people with different preferences to divide among them a heterogeneous resource (``cake''), such that the resulting division is fair accordin…
Envy-Free Cake-Cutting among Families
Erel Segal-Halevi, Shmuel Nitzan
This paper extends the classic cake-cutting problem to a situation in which the "cake" is divided among families. Each piece of cake is owned and used simultaneously by all members…