34 citations · 429 across the 66 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers · 1 filter
MUDA: A Truthful Multi-Unit Double-Auction Mechanism
Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented a truthful mechanism for double auctions, attaining asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade without any prior information on the valuatio…
How to Charge Lightning: The Economics of Bitcoin Transaction Channels
Simina Brânzei, Erel Segal-Halevi, Aviv Zohar
Off-chain transaction channels represent one of the leading techniques to scale the transaction throughput in cryptocurrencies. However, the economic effect of transaction channels…
Truthful Bilateral Trade is Impossible even with Fixed Prices
Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim
A seminal theorem of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) proves that, in a game of bilateral trade between a single buyer and a single seller, no mechanism can be simultaneously indiv…
Democratic Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods
Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to groups of agents. Agents in the same group share the same set of goods even though they may have different preference…
Fair Allocation based on Diminishing Differences
Erel Segal-Halevi, Haris Aziz, Avinatan Hassidim
Ranking alternatives is a natural way for humans to explain their preferences. It is being used in many settings, such as school choice, course allocations and residency matches. I…
Competitive Equilibrium For Almost All Incomes: Existence and Fairness
Erel Segal-Halevi
Competitive equilibrium (CE) is a fundamental concept in market economics. Its efficiency and fairness properties make it particularly appealing as a rule for fair allocation of re…
Flexible Level-1 Consensus Ensuring Stable Social Choice: Analysis and Algorithms
Mor Nitzan, Shmuel Nitzan, Erel Segal-Halevi
Level-1 Consensus is a property of a preference-profile. Intuitively, it means that there exists a preference relation which induces an ordering of all other preferences such that…
Fairly Dividing a Cake after Some Parts Were Burnt in the Oven
Erel Segal-Halevi
There is a heterogeneous resource that contains both good parts and bad parts, for example, a cake with some parts burnt, a land-estate with some parts heavily taxed, or a chore wi…
Resource-monotonicity and Population-monotonicity in Connected Cake-cutting
Erel Segal-Halevi, Balázs Sziklai
In the classic cake-cutting problem (Steinhaus, 1948), a heterogeneous resource has to be divided among n agents with different valuations in a proportional way --- giving each age…