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20122020
most citedBayesian Optimal Auctions via Multi- to Single-agent Reduction

26 citations · 41 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for

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6 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2017

Optimal Multi-Unit Mechanisms with Private Demands

Nikhil R. Devanur, Nima Haghpanah, Christos-Alexandros Psomas

In the multi-unit pricing problem, multiple units of a single item are for sale. A buyer's valuation for units of the item is , where the per unit valuation…

cs.GT2016★ 1 cited

Sequential Mechanisms with ex-post Participation Guarantees

Itai Ashlagi, Constantinos Daskalakis, Nima Haghpanah

We provide a characterization of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanisms in settings where a monopolist sells k items over k periods to a buyer who realizes his value for item i in the…

cs.GT2014★ 9 cited

Optimal Auctions for Correlated Buyers with Sampling

Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason Hartline +1

Crémer and McLean [1985] showed that, when buyers' valuations are drawn from a correlated distribution, an auction with full knowledge on the distribution can extract the full soci…

cs.GT2014★ 4 cited

Multi-dimensional Virtual Values and Second-degree Price Discrimination

Nima Haghpanah, Jason Hartline

We consider a multi-dimensional screening problem of selling a product with multiple quality levels and design virtual value functions to derive conditions that imply optimality of…

cs.GT2012★ 1 cited

The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions

Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah +1

The intuition that profit is optimized by maximizing marginal revenue is a guiding principle in microeconomics. In the classical auction theory for agents with linear utility and s…

cs.GT2012★ 26 cited

Bayesian Optimal Auctions via Multi- to Single-agent Reduction

Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah +2

We study an abstract optimal auction problem for a single good or service. This problem includes environments where agents have budgets, risk preferences, or multi-dimensional pref…