26 citations · 41 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers
How to Sell Hard Information
S. Nageeb Ali, Nima Haghpanah, Xiao Lin +1
The seller of an asset has the option to buy hard information about the value of the asset from an intermediary. The seller can then disclose the acquired information before sellin…
Optimal Multi-Unit Mechanisms with Private Demands
Nikhil R. Devanur, Nima Haghpanah, Christos-Alexandros Psomas
In the multi-unit pricing problem, multiple units of a single item are for sale. A buyer's valuation for units of the item is , where the per unit valuation…
Sequential Mechanisms with ex-post Participation Guarantees
Itai Ashlagi, Constantinos Daskalakis, Nima Haghpanah
We provide a characterization of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanisms in settings where a monopolist sells k items over k periods to a buyer who realizes his value for item i in the…
Optimal Auctions for Correlated Buyers with Sampling
Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason Hartline +1
Crémer and McLean [1985] showed that, when buyers' valuations are drawn from a correlated distribution, an auction with full knowledge on the distribution can extract the full soci…
Multi-dimensional Virtual Values and Second-degree Price Discrimination
Nima Haghpanah, Jason Hartline
We consider a multi-dimensional screening problem of selling a product with multiple quality levels and design virtual value functions to derive conditions that imply optimality of…
The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions
Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah +1
The intuition that profit is optimized by maximizing marginal revenue is a guiding principle in microeconomics. In the classical auction theory for agents with linear utility and s…
Bayesian Optimal Auctions via Multi- to Single-agent Reduction
Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah +2
We study an abstract optimal auction problem for a single good or service. This problem includes environments where agents have budgets, risk preferences, or multi-dimensional pref…