1 citations · 3 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
8 papers
Robust Auction Design in the Auto-bidding World
Santiago Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao +2
In classic auction theory, reserve prices are known to be effective for improving revenue for the auctioneer against quasi-linear utility maximizing bidders. The introduction of re…
Calibrated Click-Through Auctions: An Information Design Approach
Dirk Bergemann, Paul Duetting, Renato Paes Leme +1
We analyze the optimal information design in a click-through auction with fixed valuations per click, but stochastic click-through rates. While the auctioneer takes as given the au…
Towards Efficient Auctions in an Auto-bidding World
Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni +1
Auto-bidding has become one of the main options for bidding in online advertisements, in which advertisers only need to specify high-level objectives and leave the complex task of…
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in First-Price Auction with Discrete Value Distributions
Weiran Shen, Zihe Wang, Song Zuo
First price auctions are widely used in government contracts and industrial auctions. In this paper, we consider the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) in first price auctions with di…
The Matthew Effect in Computation Contests: High Difficulty May Lead to 51% Dominance
Yulong Zeng, Song Zuo
We study the computation contests where players compete for searching a solution to a given problem with a winner-take-all reward. The search processes are independent across the p…
Optimal Dynamic Auctions are Virtual Welfare Maximizers
Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Pingzhong Tang +1
We are interested in the setting where a seller sells sequentially arriving items, one per period, via a dynamic auction. At the beginning of each period, each buyer draws a privat…