19 citations · 33 across the 15 of their papers we have counts for
12 papers · 1 filter
Non-uniform Bid-scaling and Equilibria for Different Auctions: An Empirical Study
Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni +2
In recent years, the growing adoption of autobidding has motivated the study of auction design with value-maximizing auto-bidders. It is known that under mild assumptions, uniform…
Efficiency of the Generalized Second-Price Auction for Value Maximizers
Yuan Deng, Mohammad Mahdian, Jieming Mao +3
We study the price of anarchy of the generalized second-price auction where bidders are value maximizers (i.e., autobidders). We show that in general the price of anarchy can be as…
Bayesian Calibrated Click-Through Auction
Junjie Chen, Minming Li, Haifeng Xu +1
We study information design in click-through auctions, in which the bidders/advertisers bid for winning an opportunity to show their ads but only pay for realized clicks. The payme…
Autobidding Auctions in the Presence of User Costs
Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni +2
We study autobidding ad auctions with user costs, where each bidder is value-maximizing subject to a return-over-investment (ROI) constraint, and the seller aims to maximize the so…
Efficiency of the First-Price Auction in the Autobidding World
Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni +2
We study the price of anarchy of the first-price auction in the autobidding world, where bidders can be either utility maximizers (i.e., traditional bidders) or value maximizers (i…
Robust Auction Design in the Auto-bidding World
Santiago Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao +2
In classic auction theory, reserve prices are known to be effective for improving revenue for the auctioneer against quasi-linear utility maximizing bidders. The introduction of re…
Towards Efficient Auctions in an Auto-bidding World
Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni +1
Auto-bidding has become one of the main options for bidding in online advertisements, in which advertisers only need to specify high-level objectives and leave the complex task of…
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in First-Price Auction with Discrete Value Distributions
Weiran Shen, Zihe Wang, Song Zuo
First price auctions are widely used in government contracts and industrial auctions. In this paper, we consider the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) in first price auctions with di…
The Matthew Effect in Computation Contests: High Difficulty May Lead to 51% Dominance
Yulong Zeng, Song Zuo
We study the computation contests where players compete for searching a solution to a given problem with a winner-take-all reward. The search processes are independent across the p…
Optimal Dynamic Auctions are Virtual Welfare Maximizers
Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Pingzhong Tang +1
We are interested in the setting where a seller sells sequentially arriving items, one per period, via a dynamic auction. At the beginning of each period, each buyer draws a privat…
Generalizing Virtual Values to Multidimensional Auctions: a Non-Myersonian Approach
Song Zuo
We consider the revenue maximization problem of a monopolist via a non-Myersonian approach that could generalize to multiple items and multiple buyers. Although such an approach do…
Optimal dynamic mechanisms with ex-post IR via bank accounts
Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Pingzhong Tang +1
Lately, the problem of designing multi-stage dynamic mechanisms has been shown to be both theoretically challenging and practically important. In this paper, we consider the proble…