activity
20162022
most citedTruthful Allocation Mechanisms Without Payments: Characterization and Implications on Fairness

28 citations · 28 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

11 papers

cs.GT2022

Decentralised Update Selection with Semi-Strategic Experts

Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Philip Lazos +1

Motivated by governance models adopted in blockchain applications, we study the problem of selecting appropriate system updates in a decentralised way. Contrary to most existing vo…

cs.GT2022

Fair Division of Indivisible Goods: A Survey

Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas +1

Allocating resources to individuals in a fair manner has been a topic of interest since the ancient times, with most of the early rigorous mathematical work on the problem focusing…

cs.GT2020

A Few Queries Go a Long Way: Information-Distortion Tradeoffs in Matching

Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas +1

We consider the one-sided matching problem, where n agents have preferences over n items, and these preferences are induced by underlying cardinal valuation functions. The goal is…

cs.GT2019

Multiple Birds with One Stone: Beating for EFX and GMMS via Envy Cycle Elimination

Georgios Amanatidis, Apostolos Ntokos, Evangelos Markakis

Several relaxations of envy-freeness, tailored to fair division in settings with indivisible goods, have been introduced within the last decade. Due to the lack of general existenc…

cs.GT2019

Peeking Behind the Ordinal Curtain: Improving Distortion via Cardinal Queries

Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas +1

Aggregating the preferences of individuals into a collective decision is the core subject of study of social choice theory. In 2006, Procaccia and Rosenschein considered a utilitar…

cs.GT2019

Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-Monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and Online

Georgios Amanatidis, Pieter Kleer, Guido Schäfer

The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function subject to a hard budget constra…