128 citations · 451 across the 30 of their papers we have counts for
29 papers · 1 filter
Improved Approximation Guarantees for Groupwise Maximin Share Fairness
Georgios Amanatidis, Anna Korfiati, Evangelos Markakis +1
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of agents with additive valuation functions. We focus on the very demanding notion of \textit{grou…
Online Fair Division Meets Reordering Buffers
Georgios Amanatidis, Giulio Giaconi, Evangelos Markakis +1
We study the online fair division of indivisible mixed manna among agents with additive valuation functions. Under the standard online model, at each time step an indivisible item…
Envy Cycle Elimination with Strategic Agents: Best Responses and Fairness Guarantees
Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser
With strong evidence in the literature showing that fairness and truthfulness are incompatible, there is a recent line of work focusing on the fairness properties of equilibria of…
Online Fair Division for Personalized -Value Instances
Georgios Amanatidis, Alexandros Lolos, Evangelos Markakis +1
We study an online fair division setting, where goods arrive one at a time and there is a fixed set of agents, each of whom has an additive valuation function over the goods. O…
Online Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design with Predictions
Georgios Amanatidis, Evangelos Markakis, Christodoulos Santorinaios +3
Augmenting the input of algorithms with predictions is an algorithm design paradigm that suggests leveraging a (possibly erroneous) prediction to improve worst-case performance gua…
On the Tractability Landscape of the Conditional Minisum Approval Voting Rule
Georgios Amanatidis, Michael Lampis, Evangelos Markakis +1
This work examines the Conditional Approval Framework for elections involving multiple interdependent issues, specifically focusing on the Conditional Minisum Approval Voting Rule.…
Pandora's Box Problem With Time Constraints
Georgios Amanatidis, Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra +4
The Pandora's Box problem models the search for the best alternative when evaluation is costly. In the simplest variant, a decision maker is presented with boxes, each associat…
Pushing the Frontier on Approximate EFX Allocations
Georgios Amanatidis, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alkmini Sgouritsa
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of agents with additive valuation functions, aiming to achieve approximate envy-freeness up to any good (-…
Metric Distortion under Group-Fair Objectives
Georgios Amanatidis, Elliot Anshelevich, Christopher Jerrett +1
We consider a voting problem in which a set of agents have metric preferences over a set of alternatives, and are also partitioned into disjoint groups. Given information about the…
On the Potential and Limitations of Proxy Voting: Delegation with Incomplete Votes
Georgios Amanatidis, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Philip Lazos +2
We study elections where voters are faced with the challenge of expressing preferences over an extreme number of issues under consideration. This is largely motivated by emerging b…
Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents
Georgios Amanatidis, Sophie Klumper, Evangelos Markakis +2
Budget-feasible procurement has been a major paradigm in mechanism design since its introduction by Singer (2010). An auctioneer (buyer) with a strict budget constraint is interest…
Round-Robin Beyond Additive Agents: Existence and Fairness of Approximate Equilibria
Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Philip Lazos +2
Fair allocation of indivisible goods has attracted extensive attention over the last two decades, yielding numerous elegant algorithmic results and producing challenging open quest…
Fair Division of Indivisible Goods: Recent Progress and Open Questions
Georgios Amanatidis, Haris Aziz, Georgios Birmpas +5
Allocating resources to individuals in a fair manner has been a topic of interest since ancient times, with most of the early mathematical work on the problem focusing on resources…
Decentralised Update Selection with Semi-Strategic Experts
Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Philip Lazos +1
Motivated by governance models adopted in blockchain applications, we study the problem of selecting appropriate system updates in a decentralised way. Contrary to most existing vo…
Fair Division of Indivisible Goods: A Survey
Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas +1
Allocating resources to individuals in a fair manner has been a topic of interest since the ancient times, with most of the early rigorous mathematical work on the problem focusing…
Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness
Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Federico Fusco +3
We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of strategic agents with additive valuation functions. We assume no monetary transfers and, therefo…
A Few Queries Go a Long Way: Information-Distortion Tradeoffs in Matching
Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas +1
We consider the one-sided matching problem, where n agents have preferences over n items, and these preferences are induced by underlying cardinal valuation functions. The goal is…
Maximum Nash Welfare and Other Stories About EFX
Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas +2
We consider the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuation functions and explore the connection between two prominent fairness noti…
Multiple Birds with One Stone: Beating for EFX and GMMS via Envy Cycle Elimination
Georgios Amanatidis, Apostolos Ntokos, Evangelos Markakis
Several relaxations of envy-freeness, tailored to fair division in settings with indivisible goods, have been introduced within the last decade. Due to the lack of general existenc…
Peeking Behind the Ordinal Curtain: Improving Distortion via Cardinal Queries
Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas +1
Aggregating the preferences of individuals into a collective decision is the core subject of study of social choice theory. In 2006, Procaccia and Rosenschein considered a utilitar…
Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-Monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and Online
Georgios Amanatidis, Pieter Kleer, Guido Schäfer
The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function subject to a hard budget constra…
An Improved Envy-Free Cake Cutting Protocol for Four Agents
Georgios Amanatidis, George Christodoulou, John Fearnley +3
We consider the classic cake-cutting problem of producing envy-free allocations, restricted to the case of four agents. The problem asks for a partition of the cake to four agents,…
Comparing Approximate Relaxations of Envy-Freeness
Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Evangelos Markakis
In fair division problems with indivisible goods it is well known that one cannot have any guarantees for the classic fairness notions of envy-freeness and proportionality. As a re…
Truthful Allocation Mechanisms Without Payments: Characterization and Implications on Fairness
Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, George Christodoulou +1
We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains…