128 citations · 451 across the 30 of their papers we have counts for
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cs.GT2017★ 28 cited
Truthful Allocation Mechanisms Without Payments: Characterization and Implications on Fairness
Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, George Christodoulou +1
We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains…
cs.GT2017★ 4 cited
On Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Symmetric Submodular Objectives
Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Evangelos Markakis
We study a class of procurement auctions with a budget constraint, where an auctioneer is interested in buying resources or services from a set of agents. Ideally, the auctioneer w…