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cs.GT2022
On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms
C. Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with heterogeneous items for sale to a single additive buyer, whose values are drawn from a known, possibly correlated prior $\mathcal{D…
cs.GT2022
Fine-Grained Buy-Many Mechanisms Are Not Much Better Than Bundling
Sepehr Assadi, Vikram Kher, George Li +1
Multi-item revenue-optimal mechanisms are known to be extremely complex, often offering buyers randomized lotteries of goods. In the standard buy-one model, it is known that optima…