12 citations · 16 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
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cs.GT2019★ 1 cited
Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules: On Large Manipulating Sets and Cover-Consistence
Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg, Eitan Zlatin +1
We consider the manipulability of tournament rules, in which teams play a round robin tournament and a winner is (possibly randomly) selected based on the outcome of all $\bino…
cs.GT2019★ 12 cited
Approximation Schemes for a Unit-Demand Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries
Pravesh Kothari, Divyarthi Mohan, Ariel Schvartzman +2
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with items facing a single buyer. We introduce the notion of symmetric menu complexity of a mechanism, which counts the number of distin…