12 citations · 16 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers
On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms
C. Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with heterogeneous items for sale to a single additive buyer, whose values are drawn from a known, possibly correlated prior $\mathcal{D…
Fine-Grained Buy-Many Mechanisms Are Not Much Better Than Bundling
Sepehr Assadi, Vikram Kher, George Li +1
Multi-item revenue-optimal mechanisms are known to be extremely complex, often offering buyers randomized lotteries of goods. In the standard buy-one model, it is known that optima…
Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents
Nikhil Devanur, Kira Goldner, Raghuvansh Saxena +2
We consider revenue-optimal mechanism design in the interdimensional setting, where one dimension is the 'value' of the buyer, and one is a 'type' that captures some auxiliary info…
Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules: On Large Manipulating Sets and Cover-Consistence
Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg, Eitan Zlatin +1
We consider the manipulability of tournament rules, in which teams play a round robin tournament and a winner is (possibly randomly) selected based on the outcome of all $\bino…
Approximation Schemes for a Unit-Demand Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries
Pravesh Kothari, Divyarthi Mohan, Ariel Schvartzman +2
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with items facing a single buyer. We introduce the notion of symmetric menu complexity of a mechanism, which counts the number of distin…
Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values
Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
Consider a seller with m heterogeneous items for sale to a single additive buyer whose values for the items are arbitrarily correlated. It was previously shown that, in such settin…
The menu complexity of "one-and-a-half-dimensional" mechanism design
Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
We study the menu complexity of optimal and approximately-optimal auctions in the context of the "FedEx" problem, a so-called "one-and-a-half-dimensional" setting where a single bi…
Network coding in undirected graphs is either very helpful or not helpful at all
Mark Braverman, Sumegha Garg, Ariel Schvartzman
While it is known that using network coding can significantly improve the throughput of directed networks, it is a notorious open problem whether coding yields any advantage over t…
Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules
Jon Schneider, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
We consider the manipulability of tournament rules for round-robin tournaments of competitors. Specifically, competitors are competing for a prize, and a tournament rule $r…