16 citations · 190 across the 78 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers · 1 filter
Robust Market Equilibria with Uncertain Preferences
Riley Murray, Christian Kroer, Alex Peysakhovich +1
The problem of allocating scarce items to individuals is an important practical question in market design. An increasingly popular set of mechanisms for this task uses the concept…
Optimistic Regret Minimization for Extensive-Form Games via Dilated Distance-Generating Functions
Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm
We study the performance of optimistic regret-minimization algorithms for both minimizing regret in, and computing Nash equilibria of, zero-sum extensive-form games. In order to ap…
Scalable Fair Division for 'At Most One' Preferences
Christian Kroer, Alexander Peysakhovich
Allocating multiple scarce items across a set of individuals is an important practical problem. In the case of divisible goods and additive preferences a convex program can be used…
Fair Division Without Disparate Impact
Alexander Peysakhovich, Christian Kroer
We consider the problem of dividing items between individuals in a way that is fair both in the sense of distributional fairness and in the sense of not having disparate impact acr…
Robust Multi-agent Counterfactual Prediction
Alexander Peysakhovich, Christian Kroer, Adam Lerer
We consider the problem of using logged data to make predictions about what would happen if we changed the `rules of the game' in a multi-agent system. This task is difficult becau…
Increasing Iterate Averaging for Solving Saddle-Point Problems
Yuan Gao, Christian Kroer, Donald Goldfarb
Many problems in machine learning and game theory can be formulated as saddle-point problems, for which various first-order methods have been developed and proven efficient in prac…
Stable-Predictive Optimistic Counterfactual Regret Minimization
Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Noam Brown +1
The CFR framework has been a powerful tool for solving large-scale extensive-form games in practice. However, the theoretical rate at which past CFR-based algorithms converge to th…
Limited Lookahead in Imperfect-Information Games
Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm
Limited lookahead has been studied for decades in perfect-information games. We initiate a new direction via two simultaneous deviation points: generalization to imperfect-informat…
Computing large market equilibria using abstractions
Christian Kroer, Alexander Peysakhovich, Eric Sodomka +1
Computing market equilibria is an important practical problem for market design, for example in fair division of items. However, computing equilibria requires large amounts of info…