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20142026
most citedPacing Equilibrium in First-Price Auction Markets

16 citations · 190 across the 78 of their papers we have counts for

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Showing 2017Show all

5 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2017

Robust Stackelberg Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games and Extension to Limited Lookahead

Christian Kroer, Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm

Stackelberg equilibria have become increasingly important as a solution concept in computational game theory, largely inspired by practical problems such as security settings. In p…

cs.GT2017★ 12 cited

Regret Minimization in Behaviorally-Constrained Zero-Sum Games

Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm

No-regret learning has emerged as a powerful tool for solving extensive-form games. This was facilitated by the counterfactual-regret minimization (CFR) framework, which relies on…

cs.GT2017

Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets

Vincent Conitzer, Christian Kroer, Eric Sodomka +1

Budgets play a significant role in real-world sequential auction markets such as those implemented by internet companies. To maximize the value provided to auction participants, sp…

cs.GT2017★ 6 cited

Smoothing Method for Approximate Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibrium

Christian Kroer, Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm

Nash equilibrium is a popular solution concept for solving imperfect-information games in practice. However, it has a major drawback: it does not preclude suboptimal play in branch…

cs.GT2017★ 2 cited

Theoretical and Practical Advances on Smoothing for Extensive-Form Games

Christian Kroer, Kevin Waugh, Fatma Kilinc-Karzan +1

Sparse iterative methods, in particular first-order methods, are known to be among the most effective in solving large-scale two-player zero-sum extensive-form games. The convergen…