activity
20142026
most citedPacing Equilibrium in First-Price Auction Markets

16 citations · 190 across the 78 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

85 papers

cs.GT2026

Ex-Post Equilibria: Structure and Computation

Francesco Giordano, Julien Grand-Clément, Christian Kroer

This paper studies ex-post equilibria (EPEs) in simultaneous-move games with parameter uncertainty. We first compare EPEs with existing notions of robust equilibrium and provide a…

cs.GT2026

Competitive Equilibrium in Labor Economies through the Lens of Goods and Chores Fisher Markets

Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Christian Kroer, Ruta Mehta +2

In this paper, we study a two-sided labor market that couples the classical Fisher market with goods and the Fisher market with bads into a single unified framework. In our model,…

cs.GT2026

Online Generalized-Mean Welfare Maximization: Achieving Near-Optimal Regret from Samples

Zongjun Yang, Rachitesh Kumar, Christian Kroer

We study online fair allocation of sequentially arriving items among agents with heterogeneous preferences, with the objective of maximizing generalized-mean welfare, defin…

cs.GT2025

A Direct Second-Order Method for Solving Two-Player Zero-Sum Games

David Yang, Yuan Gao, Tianyi Lin +1

We introduce, to our knowledge, the first direct second-order method for computing Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games. To do so, we construct a Douglas-Rachford-style spl…

stat.ML2025

The Bias-Variance Tradeoff in Data-Driven Optimization: A Local Misspecification Perspective

Haixiang Lan, Luofeng Liao, Adam N. Elmachtoub +3

Data-driven stochastic optimization is ubiquitous in machine learning and operational decision-making problems. Sample average approximation (SAA) and model-based approaches such a…

math.OC2025

Strongly Convex Maximization via the Frank-Wolfe Algorithm with the Kurdyka-Łojasiewicz Inequality

Fatih Selim Aktas, Christian Kroer

We study the convergence properties of the 'greedy' Frank-Wolfe algorithm with a unit step size, for a convex maximization problem over a compact set. We assume the function satisf…

cs.LG2025

On Separation Between Best-Iterate, Random-Iterate, and Last-Iterate Convergence of Learning in Games

Yang Cai, Gabriele Farina, Julien Grand-Clément +4

Non-ergodic convergence of learning dynamics in games is widely studied recently because of its importance in both theory and practice. Recent work (Cai et al., 2024) showed that a…

cs.GT2025

Computing Lindahl Equilibrium for Public Goods with and without Funding Caps

Christian Kroer, Dominik Peters

Lindahl equilibrium is a solution concept for allocating a fixed budget across several divisible public goods. It always lies in the weak core, meaning that the equilibrium allocat…

cs.LG2024

On the Optimality of Dilated Entropy and Lower Bounds for Online Learning in Extensive-Form Games

Zhiyuan Fan, Christian Kroer, Gabriele Farina

First-order methods (FOMs) are arguably the most scalable algorithms for equilibrium computation in large extensive-form games. To operationalize these methods, a distance-generati…

cs.GT2024

Contested Logistics: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Jakub Cerny, Chun Kai Ling, Darshan Chakrabarti +4

We introduce Contested Logistics Games, a variant of logistics problems that account for the presence of an adversary that can disrupt the movement of goods in selected areas. We m…

cs.GT2024

Online Fair Allocation with Best-of-Many-Worlds Guarantees

Zongjun Yang, Luofeng Liao, Yuan Gao +1

We investigate the online fair allocation problem with sequentially arriving items under various input models, with the goal of balancing fairness and efficiency. We propose the un…

cs.GT2024

Statistical Inference and A/B Testing in Fisher Markets and Paced Auctions

Luofeng Liao, Christian Kroer

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for two market equilibrium models: linear Fisher market (LFM) equilibrium and first-price pacing equilibrium (FPPE).…

cs.GT2024

On the Convergence of Tâtonnement for Linear Fisher Markets

Tianlong Nan, Yuan Gao, Christian Kroer

Tâtonnement is a simple, intuitive market process where prices are iteratively adjusted based on the difference between demand and supply. Many variants under different market assu…

cs.GT2024

Fast Last-Iterate Convergence of Learning in Games Requires Forgetful Algorithms

Yang Cai, Gabriele Farina, Julien Grand-Clément +4

Self-play via online learning is one of the premier ways to solve large-scale two-player zero-sum games, both in theory and practice. Particularly popular algorithms include optimi…

cs.GT2024

Layered Graph Security Games

Jakub Černý, Chun Kai Ling, Christian Kroer +1

Security games model strategic interactions in adversarial real-world applications. Such applications often involve extremely large but highly structured strategy sets (e.g., selec…

cs.GT2024

Extensive-Form Game Solving via Blackwell Approachability on Treeplexes

Darshan Chakrabarti, Julien Grand-Clément, Christian Kroer

In this paper, we introduce the first algorithmic framework for Blackwell approachability on the sequence-form polytope, the class of convex polytopes capturing the strategies of p…

cs.GT2024

Competitive Equilibrium for Chores: from Dual Eisenberg-Gale to a Fast, Greedy, LP-based Algorithm

Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Christian Kroer, Ruta Mehta +1

We study the computation of competitive equilibrium for Fisher markets with agents and divisible chores. Competitive equilibria for chores are known to correspond to the no…

cs.GT2024

Automated Design of Affine Maximizer Mechanisms in Dynamic Settings

Michael Curry, Vinzenz Thoma, Darshan Chakrabarti +5

Dynamic mechanism design is a challenging extension to ordinary mechanism design in which the mechanism designer must make a sequence of decisions over time in the face of possibly…

math.ST2024★ 1 cited

Interference Among First-Price Pacing Equilibria: A Bias and Variance Analysis

Luofeng Liao, Christian Kroer, Sergei Leonenkov +4

Online A/B testing is widely used in the internet industry to inform decisions on new feature roll-outs. For online marketplaces (such as advertising markets), standard approaches…

math.ST2024

Bootstrapping Fisher Market Equilibrium and First-Price Pacing Equilibrium

Luofeng Liao, Christian Kroer

The linear Fisher market (LFM) is a basic equilibrium model from economics, which also has applications in fair and efficient resource allocation. First-price pacing equilibrium (F…

cs.GT2023

Efficient Learning in Polyhedral Games via Best Response Oracles

Darshan Chakrabarti, Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer

We study online learning and equilibrium computation in games with polyhedral decision sets, a property shared by both normal-form games and extensive-form games (EFGs), when the l…

math.OC2023★ 1 cited

Incentivizing Investment and Reliability: A Study on Electricity Capacity Markets

Cheng Guo, Christian Kroer, Yury Dvorkin +1

The capacity market, a marketplace to exchange available generation capacity for electricity production, provides a major revenue stream for generators and is adopted in several U.…

cs.GT2023

Last-Iterate Convergence Properties of Regret-Matching Algorithms in Games

Yang Cai, Gabriele Farina, Julien Grand-Clément +4

We study last-iterate convergence properties of algorithms for solving two-player zero-sum games based on Regret Matching (RM). Despite their widespread use for solving rea…

cs.GT2023

Greedy-Based Online Fair Allocation with Adversarial Input: Enabling Best-of-Many-Worlds Guarantees

Zongjun Yang, Luofeng Liao, Christian Kroer

We study an online allocation problem with sequentially arriving items and adversarially chosen agent values, with the goal of balancing fairness and efficiency. Our goal is to stu…