activity
20142026
most citedCTRL-ALT-LED: Leaking Data from Air-Gapped Computers via Keyboard LEDs

47 citations · 345 across the 33 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators
Showing 2018Show all

5 papers · 1 filter

cs.CR2018

BeatCoin: Leaking Private Keys from Air-Gapped Cryptocurrency Wallets

Mordechai Guri

Cryptocurrency wallets store the wallets private key(s), and hence, are a lucrative target for attackers. With possession of the private key, an attacker virtually owns all of the…

cs.CR2018★ 6 cited

PowerHammer: Exfiltrating Data from Air-Gapped Computers through Power Lines

Mordechai Guri, Boris Zadov, Dima Bykhovsky +1

In this paper we provide an implementation, evaluation, and analysis of PowerHammer, a malware (bridgeware [1]) that uses power lines to exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers.…

cs.CR2018★ 1 cited

MOSQUITO: Covert Ultrasonic Transmissions between Two Air-Gapped Computers using Speaker-to-Speaker Communication

Mordechai Guri, Yosef Solewicz, Andrey Daidakulov +1

In this paper we show how two (or more) airgapped computers in the same room, equipped with passive speakers, headphones, or earphones can covertly exchange data via ultrasonic wav…

cs.CR2018★ 2 cited

ODINI : Escaping Sensitive Data from Faraday-Caged, Air-Gapped Computers via Magnetic Fields

Mordechai Guri, Boris Zadov, Andrey Daidakulov +1

Air-gapped computers are computers which are kept isolated from the Internet, because they store and process sensitive information. When highly sensitive data is involved, an air-g…

cs.CR2018★ 20 cited

MAGNETO: Covert Channel between Air-Gapped Systems and Nearby Smartphones via CPU-Generated Magnetic Fields

Mordechai Guri, Andrey Daidakulov, Yuval Elovici

In this paper, we show that attackers can leak data from isolated, air-gapped computers to nearby smartphones via covert magnetic signals. The proposed covert channel works even if…