activity
20142026
most citedCTRL-ALT-LED: Leaking Data from Air-Gapped Computers via Keyboard LEDs

47 citations · 345 across the 33 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators
Showing 2016Show all

7 papers · 1 filter

cs.CR2016★ 11 cited

SPEAKE(a)R: Turn Speakers to Microphones for Fun and Profit

Mordechai Guri, Yosef Solewicz, Andrey Daidakulov +1

It is possible to manipulate the headphones (or earphones) connected to a computer, silently turning them into a pair of eavesdropping microphones - with software alone. The same i…

cs.CR2016★ 3 cited

9-1-1 DDoS: Threat, Analysis and Mitigation

Mordechai Guri, Yisroel Mirsky, Yuval Elovici

The 911 emergency service belongs to one of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors in the United States. Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks launched from a mobile phone b…

cs.CR2016

USBee: Air-Gap Covert-Channel via Electromagnetic Emission from USB

Mordechai Guri, Matan Monitz, Yuval Elovici

In recent years researchers have demonstrated how attackers could use USB connectors implanted with RF transmitters to exfiltrate data from secure, and even air-gapped, computers (…

cs.CR2016★ 10 cited

DiskFiltration: Data Exfiltration from Speakerless Air-Gapped Computers via Covert Hard Drive Noise

Mordechai Guri, Yosef Solewicz, Andrey Daidakulov +1

Air-gapped computers are disconnected from the Internet physically and logically. This measure is taken in order to prevent the leakage of sensitive data from secured networks. In…

cs.CR2016

Personal Information Leakage During Password Recovery of Internet Services

Mordechai Guri, Eyal Shemer, Dov Shirtz +1

In this paper we examine the standard password recovery process of large Internet services such as Gmail, Facebook, and Twitter. Although most of these services try to maintain use…

cs.CR2016★ 12 cited

VisiSploit: An Optical Covert-Channel to Leak Data through an Air-Gap

Mordechai Guri, Ofer Hasson, Gabi Kedma +1

In recent years, various out-of-band covert channels have been proposed that demonstrate the feasibility of leaking data out of computers without the need for network connectivity.…

cs.CR2016★ 43 cited

Fansmitter: Acoustic Data Exfiltration from (Speakerless) Air-Gapped Computers

Mordechai Guri, Yosef Solewicz, Andrey Daidakulov +1

Because computers may contain or interact with sensitive information, they are often air-gapped and in this way kept isolated and disconnected from the Internet. In recent years th…