47 citations · 345 across the 33 of their papers we have counts for
37 papers
Shape and Substance: Dual-Layer Side-Channel Attacks on Local Vision-Language Models
Eyal Hadad, Mordechai Guri
On-device Vision-Language Models (VLMs) promise data privacy via local execution. However, we show that the architectural shift toward Dynamic High-Resolution preprocessing (e.g.,…
Pico-Cloud: Cloud Infrastructure for Tiny Edge Devices
Mordechai Guri
This paper introduces the Pico-Cloud, a micro-edge cloud architecture built on ultra-minimal hardware platforms such as the Raspberry Pi Zero and comparable single-board computers.…
On the Impossibility of a Perfect Hypervisor
Mordechai Guri
We establish a fundamental impossibility result for a `perfect hypervisor', one that (1) preserves every observable behavior of any program exactly as on bare metal and (2) adds ze…
SmartAttack: Air-Gap Attack via Smartwatches
Mordechai Guri
Air-gapped systems are considered highly secure against data leaks due to their physical isolation from external networks. Despite this protection, ultrasonic communication has bee…
Browser Fingerprinting Using WebAssembly
Mordechai Guri, Dor Fibert
Web client fingerprinting has become a widely used technique for uniquely identifying users, browsers, operating systems, and devices with high accuracy. While it is beneficial for…
PIXHELL: When Pixels Learn to Scream
Mordechai Guri
This paper presents a technique for generating sound by leveraging the electrical properties of liquid crystal displays (LCDs). The phenomenon occurs due to vibrational noise produ…
PIXHELL Attack: Leaking Sensitive Information from Air-Gap Computers via `Singing Pixels'
Mordechai Guri
Air-gapped systems are disconnected from the Internet and other networks because they contain or process sensitive data. However, it is known that attackers can use computer speake…
RAMBO: Leaking Secrets from Air-Gap Computers by Spelling Covert Radio Signals from Computer RAM
Mordechai Guri
Air-gapped systems are physically separated from external networks, including the Internet. This isolation is achieved by keeping the air-gap computers disconnected from wired or w…
COVID-bit: Keep a Distance of (at least) 2m From My Air-Gap Computer!
Mordechai Guri
Air-gapped systems are isolated from the Internet due to the sensitive information they handle. This paper presents COVID-bit, a new COVert channel attack that leaks sensitive info…
ETHERLED: Sending Covert Morse Signals from Air-Gapped Devices via Network Card (NIC) LEDs
Mordechai Guri
Highly secure devices are often isolated from the Internet or other public networks due to the confidential information they process. This level of isolation is referred to as an '…
GAIROSCOPE: Injecting Data from Air-Gapped Computers to Nearby Gyroscopes
Mordechai Guri
It is known that malware can leak data from isolated, air-gapped computers to nearby smartphones using ultrasonic waves. However, this covert channel requires access to the smartph…
SATAn: Air-Gap Exfiltration Attack via Radio Signals From SATA Cables
Mordechai Guri
This paper introduces a new type of attack on isolated, air-gapped workstations. Although air-gap computers have no wireless connectivity, we show that attackers can use the SATA c…
LANTENNA: Exfiltrating Data from Air-Gapped Networks via Ethernet Cables
Mordechai Guri
Air-gapped networks are wired with Ethernet cables since wireless connections are strictly prohibited. In this paper we present LANTENNA - a new type of electromagnetic attack allo…
AIR-FI: Generating Covert Wi-Fi Signals from Air-Gapped Computers
Mordechai Guri
In this paper, we show that attackers can exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers via Wi-Fi signals. Malware in a compromised air-gapped computer can generate signals in the Wi-F…
POWER-SUPPLaY: Leaking Data from Air-Gapped Systems by Turning the Power-Supplies Into Speakers
Mordechai Guri
It is known that attackers can exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers through their speakers via sonic and ultrasonic waves. To eliminate the threat of such acoustic covert chan…
AiR-ViBeR: Exfiltrating Data from Air-Gapped Computers via Covert Surface ViBrAtIoNs
Mordechai Guri
Air-gap covert channels are special types of covert communication channels that enable attackers to exfiltrate data from isolated, network-less computers. Various types of air-gap…
BRIGHTNESS: Leaking Sensitive Data from Air-Gapped Workstations via Screen Brightness
Mordechai Guri, Dima Bykhovsky, Yuval Elovici
Air-gapped computers are systems that are kept isolated from the Internet since they store or process sensitive information. In this paper, we introduce an optical covert channel i…
CTRL-ALT-LED: Leaking Data from Air-Gapped Computers via Keyboard LEDs
Mordechai Guri, Boris Zadov, Dima Bykhovsky +1
Using the keyboard LEDs to send data optically was proposed in 2002 by Loughry and Umphress [1] (Appendix A). In this paper we extensively explore this threat in the context of a m…
BeatCoin: Leaking Private Keys from Air-Gapped Cryptocurrency Wallets
Mordechai Guri
Cryptocurrency wallets store the wallets private key(s), and hence, are a lucrative target for attackers. With possession of the private key, an attacker virtually owns all of the…
PowerHammer: Exfiltrating Data from Air-Gapped Computers through Power Lines
Mordechai Guri, Boris Zadov, Dima Bykhovsky +1
In this paper we provide an implementation, evaluation, and analysis of PowerHammer, a malware (bridgeware [1]) that uses power lines to exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers.…
MOSQUITO: Covert Ultrasonic Transmissions between Two Air-Gapped Computers using Speaker-to-Speaker Communication
Mordechai Guri, Yosef Solewicz, Andrey Daidakulov +1
In this paper we show how two (or more) airgapped computers in the same room, equipped with passive speakers, headphones, or earphones can covertly exchange data via ultrasonic wav…
ODINI : Escaping Sensitive Data from Faraday-Caged, Air-Gapped Computers via Magnetic Fields
Mordechai Guri, Boris Zadov, Andrey Daidakulov +1
Air-gapped computers are computers which are kept isolated from the Internet, because they store and process sensitive information. When highly sensitive data is involved, an air-g…
MAGNETO: Covert Channel between Air-Gapped Systems and Nearby Smartphones via CPU-Generated Magnetic Fields
Mordechai Guri, Andrey Daidakulov, Yuval Elovici
In this paper, we show that attackers can leak data from isolated, air-gapped computers to nearby smartphones via covert magnetic signals. The proposed covert channel works even if…
aIR-Jumper: Covert Air-Gap Exfiltration/Infiltration via Security Cameras & Infrared (IR)
Mordechai Guri, Dima Bykhovsky, Yuval Elovici
Infrared (IR) light is invisible to humans, but cameras are optically sensitive to this type of light. In this paper, we show how attackers can use surveillance cameras and infrare…