Showing econ.THShow all
3 papers · 1 filter
econ.TH2025
Efficiency in Games with Incomplete Information
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Atulya Jain +1
We study games with incomplete information and characterize when a feasible outcome is Pareto efficient. Outcomes with excessive randomization are inefficient: generically, the tot…
econ.TH2025
Robust Price Discrimination
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Omer Madmon +1
We consider a model of third-degree price discrimination where the seller's product valuation is unknown to the market designer, who aims to maximize buyer surplus by revealing buy…
econ.TH2024
Feasible Conditional Belief Distributions
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy
Agents receive private signals about an unknown state. The resulting joint belief distributions are complex and lack a simple characterization. Our key insight is that, when condit…