4 papers
Efficiency in Games with Incomplete Information
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Atulya Jain +1
We study games with incomplete information and characterize when a feasible outcome is Pareto efficient. Outcomes with excessive randomization are inefficient: generically, the tot…
Robust Price Discrimination
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Omer Madmon +1
We consider a model of third-degree price discrimination where the seller's product valuation is unknown to the market designer, who aims to maximize buyer surplus by revealing buy…
Can Almost Everybody be Almost Happy? PCP for PPAD and the Inapproximability of Nash
Yakov Babichenko, Christos Papadimitriou, Aviad Rubinstein
We conjecture that PPAD has a PCP-like complete problem, seeking a near equilibrium in which all but very few players have very little incentive to deviate. We show that, if one as…
Feasible Conditional Belief Distributions
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy
Agents receive private signals about an unknown state. The resulting joint belief distributions are complex and lack a simple characterization. Our key insight is that, when condit…