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cs.GT2024
Algorithmic Cheap Talk
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu +1
The literature on strategic communication originated with the influential cheap talk model, which precedes the Bayesian persuasion model by three decades. This model describes an i…
cs.GT2024
Information Design in the Principal-Agent Problem
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu +1
We study a variant of the principal-agent problem in which the principal does not directly observe the agent's effort outcome; rather, she gets a signal about the agent's action ac…
cs.GT2024
Persuading while Learning
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Dimitry Shaiderman +1
We propose a dynamic product adoption persuasion model involving an impatient partially informed sender who gradually learns the state. In this model, the sender gathers informatio…