activity
20152022
most citedMatchings under Preferences: Strength of Stability and Trade-offs

6 citations · 24 across the 11 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

18 papers

cs.GT2022

Game Implementation: What Are the Obstructions?

Jiehua Chen, Sebastian Vincent Haydn, Negar Layegh Khavidaki +2

In many applications, we want to influence the decisions of independent agents by designing incentives for their actions. We revisit a fundamental problem in this area, called GAME…

cs.GT20221 cited

2-Dimensional Euclidean Preferences

Laurent Bulteau, Jiehua Chen

A preference profile with m alternatives and n voters is 2-dimensional Euclidean if both the alternatives and the voters can be placed into a 2-dimensional space such that for each…

cs.MA20221 cited

Parameterized Intractability for Multi-Winner Election under the Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the Monroe Rule

Jiehua Chen, Sanjukta Roy

Answering an open question by Betzler et al. [Betzler et al., JAIR'13], we resolve the parameterized complexity of the multi-winner determination problem under two famous represent…

cs.GT20212 cited

On (Coalitional) Exchange-Stable Matching

Jiehua Chen, Adrian Chmurovic, Fabian Jogl +1

We study (coalitional) exchange stability, which Alcalde [Economic Design, 1995] introduced as an alternative solution concept for matching markets involving property rights, such…

cs.MA2021

Participatory Budgeting with Donations and Diversity Constraints

Jiehua Chen, Martin Lackner, Jan Maly

Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic process where citizens jointly decide on how to allocate public funds to indivisible projects. This paper focuses on PB processes where…

cs.GT20202 cited

Fractional Matchings under Preferences: Stability and Optimality

Jiehua Chen, Sanjukta Roy, Manuel Sorge

We thoroughly study a generalized version of the classic Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems where agents may share partners. We consider two prominent stability concepts…