36 citations · 122 across the 33 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
Adapting Stable Matchings to Evolving Preferences
Robert Bredereck, Jiehua Chen, Dušan Knop +2
Adaptivity to changing environments and constraints is key to success in modern society. We address this by proposing "incrementalized versions" of Stable Marriage and Stable Roomm…
Reaching Stable Marriage via Divorces is Hard
Jiehua Chen
We study the Reaching Stable Marriage via Divorces (DivorceSM) problem of deciding, given a Stable Marriage instance and an initial matching , whether there exists a stable mat…
Good Things Come to Those Who Swap Objects on Paths
Matthias Bentert, Jiehua Chen, Vincent Froese +1
We study a simple exchange market, introduced by Gourvés, Lesca and Wilczynski (IJCAI-17), where every agent initially holds a single object. The agents have preferences over the o…
Computational Complexity of Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates and Their Variants
Jiehua Chen
This paper gives an overview on and summarizes existing complexity and algorithmic results of some variants of the Stable Marriage and the Stable Roommates problems. The last secti…
Stable Roommates with Narcissistic, Single-Peaked, and Single-Crossing Preferences
Robert Bredereck, Jiehua Chen, Ugo Paavo Finnendahl +1
The classical Stable Roommates problem is to decide whether there exists a matching of an even number of agents such that no two agents which are not matched to each other would pr…
Matchings under Preferences: Strength of Stability and Trade-offs
Jiehua Chen, Piotr Skowron, Manuel Sorge
We propose two solution concepts for matchings under preferences: robustness and near stability. The former strengthens while the latter relaxes the classic definition of stability…