activity
20142026
most citedElections with Few Voters: Candidate Control Can Be Easy

36 citations · 122 across the 33 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators
Showing cs.MAShow all

9 papers · 1 filter

cs.MA2023★ 1 cited

Efficient Algorithms for Monroe and CC Rules in Multi-Winner Elections with (Nearly) Structured Preferences

Jiehua Chen, Christian Hatschka, Sofia Simola

We investigate winner determination for two popular proportional representation systems: the Monroe and Chamberlin-Courant (abbrv. CC) systems. Our study focuses on (nearly) single…

cs.MA2022★ 1 cited

Parameterized Intractability for Multi-Winner Election under the Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the Monroe Rule

Jiehua Chen, Sanjukta Roy

Answering an open question by Betzler et al. [Betzler et al., JAIR'13], we resolve the parameterized complexity of the multi-winner determination problem under two famous represent…

cs.MA2022

Multidimensional Manhattan Preferences

Jiehua Chen, Martin Nöllenburg, Sofia Simola +2

A preference profile (i.e., a collection of linear preference orders of the voters over a set of alternatives) with alternatives and voters is -Manhattan (resp. -Eucl…

cs.MA2021★ 3 cited

Participatory Budgeting with Donations and Diversity Constraints

Jiehua Chen, Martin Lackner, Jan Maly

Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic process where citizens jointly decide on how to allocate public funds to indivisible projects. This paper focuses on PB processes where…

cs.MA2018★ 1 cited

Stable Marriage with Multi-Modal Preferences

Jiehua Chen, Rolf Niedermeier, Piotr Skowron

We introduce a generalized version of the famous Stable Marriage problem, now based on multi-modal preference lists. The central twist herein is to allow each agent to rank its pot…

cs.MA2017

On the Computational Complexity of Variants of Combinatorial Voter Control in Elections

Leon Kellerhals, Viatcheslav Korenwein, Philipp Zschoche +2

Voter control problems model situations in which an external agent tries toaffect the result of an election by adding or deleting the fewest number of voters. The goal of the agent…

cs.MA2015

Prices Matter for the Parameterized Complexity of Shift Bribery

Robert Bredereck, Jiehua Chen, Piotr Faliszewski +2

In the Shift Bribery problem, we are given an election (based on preference orders), a preferred candidate , and a budget. The goal is to ensure that wins by shifting hi…

cs.MA2014

Parameterized Algorithmics for Computational Social Choice: Nine Research Challenges

Robert Bredereck, Jiehua Chen, Piotr Faliszewski +3

Computational Social Choice is an interdisciplinary research area involving Economics, Political Science, and Social Science on the one side, and Mathematics and Computer Science (…

cs.MA2014★ 7 cited

Combinatorial Voter Control in Elections

Laurent Bulteau, Jiehua Chen, Piotr Faliszewski +2

Voter control problems model situations such as an external agent trying to affect the result of an election by adding voters, for example by convincing some voters to vote who wou…