20 citations · 95 across the 39 of their papers we have counts for
58 papers
Strategizing against No-Regret Learners in First-Price Auctions
Aviad Rubinstein, Junyao Zhao
We study repeated first-price auctions and general repeated Bayesian games between two players, where one player, the learner, employs a no-regret learning algorithm, and the other…
Practical algorithms and experimentally validated incentives for equilibrium-based fair division (A-CEEI)
Eric Budish, Ruiquan Gao, Abraham Othman +2
Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (A-CEEI) is an equilibrium-based solution concept for fair division of discrete items to agents with combinatorial demands. I…
Near Optimal Memory-Regret Tradeoff for Online Learning
Binghui Peng, Aviad Rubinstein
In the experts problem, on each of days, an agent needs to follow the advice of one of ``experts''. After each day, the loss associated with each expert's advice is reveale…
Sublinear Algorithms for TSP via Path Covers
Soheil Behnezhad, Mohammad Roghani, Aviad Rubinstein +1
We study sublinear time algorithms for the traveling salesman problem (TSP). First, we focus on the closely related {\em maximum path cover} problem, which asks for a collection of…
Sublinear Time Algorithms and Complexity of Approximate Maximum Matching
Soheil Behnezhad, Mohammad Roghani, Aviad Rubinstein
Sublinear time algorithms for approximating maximum matching size have long been studied. Much of the progress over the last two decades on this problem has been on the algorithmic…
Beyond Worst-Case Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design
Aviad Rubinstein, Junyao Zhao
Motivated by large-market applications such as crowdsourcing, we revisit the problem of budget-feasible mechanism design under a "small-bidder assumption". Anari, Goel, and Nikzad…