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20112026
most citedMastering Atari, Go, Chess and Shogi by Planning with a Learned Model

1.2k citations · 4.4k across the 42 of their papers we have counts for

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Showing 2018Show all

8 papers · 1 filter

cs.NE2018

Malthusian Reinforcement Learning

Joel Z. Leibo, Julien Perolat, Edward Hughes +6

Here we explore a new algorithmic framework for multi-agent reinforcement learning, called Malthusian reinforcement learning, which extends self-play to include fitness-linked popu…

cs.LG2018★ 51 cited

Relational Forward Models for Multi-Agent Learning

Andrea Tacchetti, H. Francis Song, Pedro A. M. Mediano +5

The behavioral dynamics of multi-agent systems have a rich and orderly structure, which can be leveraged to understand these systems, and to improve how artificial agents learn to…

cs.LG2018★ 693 cited

Human-level performance in first-person multiplayer games with population-based deep reinforcement learning

Max Jaderberg, Wojciech M. Czarnecki, Iain Dunning +15

Recent progress in artificial intelligence through reinforcement learning (RL) has shown great success on increasingly complex single-agent environments and two-player turn-based g…

cs.GT2018

Adaptive Mechanism Design: Learning to Promote Cooperation

Tobias Baumann, Thore Graepel, John Shawe-Taylor

In the future, artificial learning agents are likely to become increasingly widespread in our society. They will interact with both other learning agents and humans in a variety of…

cs.LG2018★ 36 cited

Re-evaluating Evaluation

David Balduzzi, Karl Tuyls, Julien Perolat +1

Progress in machine learning is measured by careful evaluation on problems of outstanding common interest. However, the proliferation of benchmark suites and environments, adversar…

cs.GT2018

A Generalised Method for Empirical Game Theoretic Analysis

Karl Tuyls, Julien Perolat, Marc Lanctot +2

This paper provides theoretical bounds for empirical game theoretical analysis of complex multi-agent interactions. We provide insights in the empirical meta game showing that a Na…